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FRAGMENTING THE COMMUNITY:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOCAL
POLICE NON-COOPERATION POLICIES
NATASHIA TIDWELL
INTRODUCTION
The police seek and preserve public favor, not by catering to
public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolute
impartial service to the law, in complete independence of policy,
to the justice or injustice of the substance of
and without regard
1
individual laws.

-Sir Robert Peel, the "architectof modern policing"
Sir Robert Peel's idyllic vision of the police as an unbiased,
non-partisan institution may seem anachronistic today. Our
increasingly pluralistic society requires that police officials
balance the competing interests of various groups while
simultaneously remaining true to their law enforcement
mission.2 Our nation's continued struggle with immigration
t Associate Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston, former police
lieutenant and federal prosecutor. This Article was borne out of many discussions
with Cambridge Police Commissioner Robert Haas during my tenure as a member of
his advisory board. My experience as a police officer during the nascent stages of the
community policing movement in Cambridge also provided me with insight and
inspiration for this topic. This Article benefitted greatly from discussions with my
former law enforcement colleagues. I am particularly indebted to my colleagues at
New England Law I Boston for their thoughtful and helpful comments and research
ideas. I am also grateful to Nicole Melman for her excellent research assistance.
New England Law I Boston graciously provided a summer research stipend to help
complete this piece.
1 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 106 (1996) (quoting
SIR ROBERT PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1829)).

2 See Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
187, 187 (2009). Unlike monolithic societies linked by commonality of religious and
social customs, today's pluralistic societies generally do not share a "unified set of
norms dictating right and wrong." Id. Police authority is difficult to exert in modern
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reform compounds the complexity of this already daunting
challenge. From a constitutional standpoint, immigration law is
a wholly federal matter. Practically speaking, however, state
and local police officials play a significant role in the federal
While the overwhelming
immigration enforcement regime.
majority of immigrants in the United States have legal status, a
sizable portion of that population is undocumented.
The federal government's increased reliance upon local police
to assist in federal enforcement efforts, coupled with Congress's
failure to pass meaningful reform, has transformed the local
police chief into the "public face of the immigration debate in
[his] community."4 In that role, these officials struggle to strike
the proper balance between "community" and "policing."' The
controversy surrounding Secure Communities ("S-Comm."),6 a
federal initiative that calls for local police departments to share
arrestee fingerprint data with immigration authorities, raises the
question of whether the two competing concerns are mutually
exclusive.
Initially trumpeted as a strategy for deporting the "worst of
the worst," in other words, illegal immigrants previously
convicted of violent felonies,7
S-Comm. garnered national
pluralistic society where there exists a "diversity of views about what is appropriate
and reasonable." Id.
I There are approximately eleven million unauthorized immigrants living in the
United States as of 2011. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1

(2012), available at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/oisill-pe2011.pdf, Jeffrey S. Passel & DVera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrants: 11.1 Million
in 2011, PEW RESEARCH HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/unauthorized-immigrants-11-1-million-in2011.
4 See Chuck Wexler, Foreword to DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., POLICE EXEC.
RESEARCH FORUM, POLICE AND IMMIGRATION: How CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR

COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE CHALLENGES, at xii (2010), available at www.police
forum.org/library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2Oll.pdf.
See id. (detailing study of six American cities with contentious local battles
over immigration).
" Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, www.ice.gov/secure-communities/get-

the-facts.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) [hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES]. For
additional discussion of S-Comm. and other local non-cooperation policies, see infra
notes 55-65.
7 SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 6. As of August 31, 2012, more than
166,000 immigrants have been removed through S-Comm. Id. As of January 22,
2013, the capability for biometric information sharing with ICE through S-Comm
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attention and became the subject of heated and bitter political
discourse after several high-profile mistakes in implementation.8
Critics charged that, in addition to encouraging racial profiling9
and violating due process, 10 S-Comm. created the justifiable fear
among immigrants, including those in the country legally, that
cooperation with the police could lead to deportation. Faced with
intense pressure to respond, government leaders in major
metropolitan cities like New York and Chicago notified federal
authorities of their intent to "opt out" of S-Comm.11 This Article
challenges the soundness of opting out and similar noncooperation policies and argues that any benefit the police hope
to gain in building relationships with immigrant communities
must be counterbalanced against the potential fragmentation of
the larger community where dissident voices are either ignored
or derisively dismissed.
Part I traces the historical roots of the relationship between
local police and federal immigration authorities, beginning with
the changes in enforcement strategy precipitated by the
September 11, 2001 attacks and leading up to the launch of SComm. The federal government's increased reliance on local
was activated in 3,181 jurisdictions. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (2013) [hereinafter
ACTIVATED
JURISDICTIONS],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.
8 See Kirk Semple, Program To Have Police Spot Illegal Immigrants Is Mired in
Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A26; see also Lee Romney, U.S. To
Investigate Secure Communities Deportation Program, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/18/nation/la-na-secure-communities-20110519;
Maria Sacchetti, Traffic Cases Settled, but Deportations Loom; Minor Offenders
Snared in Immigration Program Aimed at Serious Crimes, BOS. GLOBE, July 3,
2011, at 1.
NAT'L
IMMIGRATION
FORUM,
SECURE
COMMUNITIES,
available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/SecureCommunities.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 18, 2014); see also Shadi Masri, Current Developments, Executive
Branch: ICE's Initiation of Secure Communities Program Draws More Criticism
Than Praise,25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533, 535-36 (2011).
10 See AARTI KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW &
SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS
AND
DUE
PROCESS
3-4
(2011),
available
at

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/SecureCommunitiesby theNumbers.pdf. But
see Peter H. Schuck, Three States Short of a Secure Community, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2011, at A27 (maintaining that, despite the flawed roll-out, S-Comm. is worth
salvaging).
11 See Letter from Mylan L. Denerstein, Counsel to the Governor, to John
Sandweg, Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S Dep't of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011),
available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf.
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police to supplement its internal enforcement efforts has raised
several Tenth Amendment concerns as the states struggle to
define the proper scope of their "inherent authority" to act in
immigration matters, with officials in some so-called sanctuary
cities insisting that their inherent authority to enforce federal
immigration law is commensurate with the sovereign right to
refuse to cooperate.
Is opting out likely to succeed as a strategy for gaining the
trust and cooperation of immigrants? Part II explores that
question. Using the work of leading social psychologist Tom
Tyler as a framework for discussion, I conclude that trust and
cooperation are an outgrowth of individual perceptions of
legitimacy. The quest for legitimacy, or those properties of a
police department that "lead[] people to feel that [the
department] is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed,"12 has
precipitated every major historical shift in policing, from the
professional model to present-day community policing. These
failed models and the promise of community policing are
examined in Part III.
Ever since it emerged as the model of police reform in the
late 1980s, community policing's imprimatur has been bestowed
upon a myriad of outreach strategies, particularly those aimed
toward improving the fractured relationship between police and
minority communities.1 3 Tensions between police and minorities,
fueled by decades of physical abuse and deceptive tactics, have
contributed to an ethnic gap in the manner in which people view

12 Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513, 514
(2003).

"3 See CHI. POLICE DEP'T, STRENGTHENING RELATIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND
MINORITY COMMUNITIES: ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EFFECTIVE POLICING IN
CHICAGO'S DIVERSE NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (2000), available at https://portal.chicago

police.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Other%20Repor
ts/RaceRelations.pdf; ROBERT WASSERMAN, GUIDANCE FOR BUILDING COMMUNITIES

OF TRUST 3 (2010), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/
e071021293_buildingcommtrust-revision.pdf ("The Building Communities of Trust
(BCOT) initiative focuses on developing relationships of trust between law
enforcement.., and the communities they serve, particularly immigrant and
minority communities...."); Community Relations Division, L.A. POLICE
DEPARTMENT, http://www.lapdonline.org/insidethelapd/contentbasic view/2034
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (stating that the "Community Relations Division
continuously strives toward maintaining open avenues of discourse," especially with
minority communities).
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the police. 14 Community policing represented a seismic shift in
the police's approach to interacting with minorities, specifically
in its prioritization of partnerships with affected communities
and the solicitation of community input in shaping the
department's enforcement agenda. The increased role of the
community has fueled fears that the police, in seeking
cooperation from various segments of the community, would
ultimately become co-opted by the special interests of those
highly vocal and politically active segments of the community. 15
In Part IV, I argue that the dangers of co-optation increase
exponentially when community-generated expansions of police
discretionary authority, like opting out, are involved. In the
past, similar expansions of discretionary authority have received
harsh criticism from those who insist that the use of discretion
fragments communities by creating winners and losers.
According to critics, the "losers" are typically minorities and
other disenfranchised groups. In the case of non-enforcement of
immigration law, when the "winners" are a historically
disenfranchised minority group, it is easy and convenient to
The
derisively dismiss opponents as xenophobic or racist.
competing interests, attitudes, and agendas that exist within
communities and between minority groups are largely ignored. It
is these differences that the police should consider when
promulgating policies designed to improve their relationships
with one segment of the minority community.

'" See Richard
R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219, 1221 (2000) ("African Americans are broadly viewed to perceive law
enforcement with suspicion and distrust."); Krissah Thompson & Jon Cohen,
Trayvon Martin Case: Poll Finds Stark Racial Divide, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trayvon-martin-case-poll-finds-stark-racialdivide/2012/04/10/gIQAEETX8S-story.html (stating that five of ten whites say
minorities are not equitably treated whereas eight of ten African Americans believe
they are discriminated against). Perhaps the most famous example of the
black/white divide came on the heels of the O.J. Simpson verdict. See Jennifer
Auther, American Press Reflects Racial Divide on Simpson Case, CNN (Jan. 20,
1997, 9:45 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-20/us/9701 20_simpson.presslsimpson-trial-dennis-schatzman-nicole-simpson?_s=PM:US ("Many blacks cheered
when jurors declared Simpson innocent ....Many whites shook their heads.").
1 David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 765, 770-71 (2001). This co-optation, according to Thacher, results from a
police department's abandonment of "essential institutional values in order to secure
outside support." Id. at 770.
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THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

While the Constitution vests the power to enact and enforce
immigration law in the federal government, 6 state and local
authorities have long played a role in our country's interior
immigration enforcement efforts. Questions related to the scope
of that role, including the ability of local executives to refuse or
expand it, have intensified in recent years. Tensions reached a
near boiling point when Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") signaled its intent to make S-Comm. mandatory for all
jurisdictions in 2013,"7 leading local executives to announce plans
to challenge the federal government's authority to require
participation."8
ICE has since made efforts to clarify its
position,' 9 but the picture remains murky. 20 The uncertainty
surrounding the states' ability to opt out of federal immigration
initiatives like S-Comm. is an outgrowth of the historical failure
to clearly delineate the role each sovereign plays in this crucial
area.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4.
See Semple, supra note 8; Draft Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Beth N.
Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 2,
2010),
available
at
http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/
Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf.
18 Julia Preston & Steven Yaccino, Policy on Immigrants Is Challenged by
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A14 (Rahm Emanuel may refuse to turn "over
illegal immigrants to federal agents if the immigrants do not have serious criminal
convictions or outstanding criminal warrants.").
19 See Letter from Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting ICE Dir., to U.S. Representative
Mike Thompson et al. (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.notonemore
deportation.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/13-5346-Thompson-signed-response02.25.14.pdf (admitting that requests from ICE for the detention of local arrestees
suspected of violating immigration law are non-compulsory). Despite its clarification
on the mandatory nature of detainers, ICE maintains its position that once a state
submits information to one federal agency, such as the FBI through the NCIC, it
cannot legally prevent the federal government from sharing it with another federal
agency, like the DHS. Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Jack Markell, Governor of Del. (Aug.
5, 2011), available at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-l.amazonaws.com/docs/213/
275867/SGNRSP forJackMarkell.pdf.
20
See Michael Levenson, Walsh Wants Boston Out of Immigrant ID Program,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 26, 2013), http'//www.bostonglobe.com/2013/11/26/mayor-electwalsh-says-wants-boston-pull-out-secure-communities-program/BikbYnaoqlGwMW
mM06uPrO/story.html (reporting that, despite deep dissatisfaction with the federal
initiative, local executives continue to believe they lack the authority to opt out of SComm.).
16
'"
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The Role of the States Under the Immigration and
NationalityAct

In the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the most
comprehensive piece of federal immigration legislation to date,21
Congress granted local and state police arrest authority for
certain violations of immigration law, such as alien smuggling
and unlawful entry or reentry.2 2 Other INA provisions authorize
local police to arrest previously deported felons but only upon3
2
receipt of approval to act from federal immigration authorities.
Even in the absence of an express congressional grant of
authority, the federal government, through the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), has long recognized and sanctioned the power of
local police to detain, for limited periods, those individuals
21 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2014). In 1996, the INA underwent two key
amendments that expanded the states' authority to enforce federal immigration. The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") granted to the
states the power to arrest and detain previously deported undocumented persons
with prior felony convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2012). That same year,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
("IIRIRA"), which established a program for the cross-designation and training of
local police officers in federal immigration law. See id. § 1357(g) (2012). For further
discussion of the § 287(g) program, named for its statutory designation, see infra
notes 30-58 and accompanying text.
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), (iv) (2012). The alien smuggling provision
grants arrest authority to "officers and employees of the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service] designated by the Attorney General ... and all other officers
whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws." Id. § 1324(c). Criminal immigration
violations can be felonies and misdemeanors, and are punishable by imprisonment,
deportation, or both. Unlawful entry is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or
imprisonment for a maximum of six months for the first offense. See id. § 1325(a).
Many states, including California, impose an "in-presence" requirement to the right
of arrest for misdemeanor offenses like unlawful entry meaning, in effect, that a
suspected alien would need to be apprehended while crossing the border into the
United States in order for a valid arrest to occur. See Gates v. L.A. Superior Court,
238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (Ct. App. 1987). Undocumented persons who have moved
past the border and reached a place of repose are more properly characterized as
being illegally present, a civil, rather than criminal, immigration violation
punishable by removal rather than arrest. See Assistance by State and Local Police
in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C. 26, 39 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 OLC
Opinion] ("Absent an authoritative clarifying decision on this issue, however,
warrantless arrests.., for illegal entry violations must be considered legally invalid
when the alien has already completed his entry into the United States."). The
Supreme Court declined an opportunity to address the confusion in Immigration &
NaturalizationService v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.3 (1984) ("We need
not decide whether or not remaining in this country following an illegal entry is a
continuing or a completed crime under § 1325.").
23 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c).
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suspected of violating criminal immigration laws.24 In a 1996
advisory opinion issued by its Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"),
the DOJ expressed its support for the states' willingness to assist
effort while
enforcement
in the federal immigration
simultaneously affirming its belief that such matters should
25
ideally be left in the hands of federal law enforcement officials.
The DOJ's tepid approval of state involvement in criminal
immigration matters stands in stark contrast to its emphatically
stated position regarding local police power to enforce civil
violations of federal immigration law. In its 1996 Opinion, the
OLC declared that local police lacked the authority to arrest or
detain individuals who are deportable as a result of an expired
visa or other change in immigration status.2 6 According to the
DOJ, these offenses, and others that could result in removal via
the civil deportation process, were outside of the states'
jurisdictional purview, even in those instances when a warrant
for deportation had issued against the suspected violator.2 7 Six
years later, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the federal government's priorities shifted dramatically as
did the DOJ's take on the states' role in our country's
immigration enforcement efforts.

24 See 1996 OLC Opinion, supra note 22, at 28 (approving local police practice of
detaining criminal suspects until such time as federal immigration authorities, such
as Border Patrol, were able to assume custody). But see Michael J. Wishnie, State
and Local Police Enforcement of ImmigrationLaws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1092
(2004) (arguing that the explicit provisions of the INA delineating the scope of local
and state police authority evidence congressional intent to preempt exercises of
authority not expressly granted).
'5 1996 OLC Opinion, supra note 22, at 26, 28 (cautioning that the "proper
investigation, processing, and arrest of suspected immigration violators generally
requires the presence and assistance of [federal authorities]").
26 Id. at 26. Local police could be granted extra-jurisdictional arrest authority
through the deputization process. See id. at 47 ("So deputized, such personnel would
be empowered to make warrantless arrests of illegal immigration suspects and
perform certain other INA enforcement tasks that they might not otherwise be
authorized to do in their capacity as state officers.").
27 Id. at 27, 31. Even though violations of civil offenses such as overstaying a
visa could result in the issuance of a warrant of deportation, the Office of Legal
Counsel stated that local police had no authority to detain suspected violators in the
absence of a criminal law violation. See id. The DOJ does, however, possess the
statutory authority to extend civil detention authority to the states under the
IIRIRA's "mass influx" provision. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2012).
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The "InherentAuthority" of the States in the Wake of the
September 11th Attacks

B.

On September 11, 2001, a group of Middle Eastern terrorists
carried out four coordinated suicide attacks against the United
States, resulting in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people.2" Soon
after the attacks, law enforcement officials discovered that at
least two of the nineteen terrorists, including suspected
ringleader Mohammed Atta, were subject to civil deportation
proceedings after having overstayed their immigration visas.29
State and local police records also revealed that local police had
detained the suspects on unrelated matters in the months
preceding the attacks. 30 At the time, however, local police were
neither privy to civil immigration data nor authorized to
intervene in such matters. 1
As a result of these and other perceived lapses, federal law
enforcement priorities shifted, and resources, both financial and
in the form of personnel, were redeployed.3 2 The Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") was created and the War on Terror
supplanted the War on Drugs as our country's preeminent law

28

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION

AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S CONTACTS WITH Two SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORISTS,
at 1 (2002) [hereinafter CONTACTS WITH TWO SEPT. 11 TERRORISTS].

Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority
of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 183-84 (2005)
(detailing immigration violations committed by four of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers).
Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi entered the country legally in June 2000, and
as visitors, their visas expired six months after entry; however, each requested a
change in status to students so that they might enroll in flight school in Florida.
CONTACTS WITH Two SEPT. 11 TERRORISTS, supra note 28, at 1.
29

30 See JESSICA M. VAUGHAN & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, THE 287(g) PROGRAM: PROTECTING HOME TOWNS AND HOMELAND 1 (2009)

(detailing September 9, 2001 encounter between Maryland State Police and Ziad
Jarrah, who hijacked and later piloted United Airlines Flight 93 as it crashed into a
field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania); Kobach, supra note 29, at 184-85 (discussing
motor vehicle stops of Mohammed Atta in the months leading up to the attacks).
11Kobach, supra note 29, at 187-88 (discussing both the lack of immigration
information available to local law enforcement and also the lack of ability to make
an arrest for the civil violation).
32 See LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009).

Prior to the attacks, the Immigration and Naturalization Serivce ("INS") had fewer
than 2,000 federal agents tasked with enforcing immigration laws in the United
States. Id. After the attacks, the INS was merged with U.S. Customs Service into
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), effectively doubling
the number of available federal agents. See id.
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enforcement imitative.13 In addition to these internal structural
changes, the federal government, the DOJ specifically,
"reconsider[ed]" the 1996 OLC Opinion and its prohibition
against local and state police enforcement of civil immigration
violations.34
In a second OLC memorandum ("2002 OLC Memo"), the DOJ
announced that, much like Dorothy and her red shoes,3 5 the
individual states-and their law enforcement representativeswere ordained with the "inherent authority" to enforce both civil
and criminal immigration laws. 6 The DOJ withdrew the 1996
OLC Opinion, characterizing the earlier memorandum's
conclusion that local police were unauthorized to act in civil
immigration matters as "mistaken" and unsupported by both the
33 Randolph Capps, Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Evolution of the
287(g) Program and Its Potential Impacts on Local Communities, in POLICE

FOUNDATION, THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, app. 155, 155 (2009). The INS

was replaced by ICE. According to the Urban Institute, in its first few years of
existence, ICE arrested approximately 5,000 undocumented persons per year during
fiscal years 2006-2008-roughly ten times the pace of arrests affected by its
predecessor, the INS. See id.
34 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Non-Preemption of the Authority of
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration
Violations 1-2 (Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 OLC Memo], available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
35 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
36 See 2002 OLC Memo, supra note 34, at 2-3 ("We therefore do not believe that
the authority of state police to make arrests for violation of federal law is limited to
those instances in which they are exercising delegated federal power. We instead
believe that such arrest authority inheres in the states' status as sovereign
entities."). Although the 2002 OLC Memo was drafted April 3, 2002, it was not
publicly released until 2005. In National Council of La Raza v. Department of
Justice, the Second Circuit ordered the DOJ to release the memorandum to counsel
for the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project. 411 F.3d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 2005). The
specific question presented in the 2002 OLC Memo was whether 18 U.S.C. § 1252(c),
which criminalizes the reentry of previously deported illegal immigrants, preempted
state arrest authority since it did not delegate authority. 2002 OLC Memo, supra
note 34, at 8. For discussion and competing views of the constitutionality of inherent
authority doctrine, compare Kobach, supra note 29, at 199, asserting that State
police powers, unlike the federal government's powers, are not specifically
enumerated and therefore encompass any actions taken to protect the "lives, health,
morals, comfort and general welfare" of its citizens, with Huyen Pham, The Inherent
Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of
ImmigrationLaws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2004),
arguing that permitting states to choose whether to enforce federal immigration law
will create a patchwork that violates the constitutional requirement of uniformity in
enforcement of immigration law.
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INA's legislative history and existing precedent. In reaching its
determination that the states possessed the inherent authority to
enforce immigration law, the DOJ relied on the states' status as
sovereign entities and adopted a "strong presumption" against
interpretations of immigration law that would deny federal
enforcement authorities the assistance that states might
provide. 8
C. CooperationAgreements: The 287(g) Programand S-Comm.
On the heels of the 2002 OLC Memo, the federal government
made a concerted effort to increase the role of local and state
police in immigration enforcement. 9 One component of the
federal government's strategy involved the revival of section
287(g), a provision of the 1996 INA amendment that authorized
the Attorney General to enter into written agreements with state
and local governments vesting local police with the power to
perform the functions of a federal immigration officer.40
Although it had been in existence since 1996, the 287(g) program
received little or no attention, as governing officials in areas with
heavy concentrations of new arrivals were reluctant to commit
their police departments to full-scale immigration enforcement.4 1
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the political tide
shifted and several jurisdictions, beginning with Florida,
17 See 2002 OLC Memo, supra note 34, at 2. Of the 1996 OLC Opinion's reliance
on existing precedent, the DOJ went on to say, "On re-examination, we believe that
the authorities we cited in the 1996 OLC Opinion provide no support for our
conclusion that state police lack the authority to arrest aliens solely on the basis of
civil deportability." Id. at 7. For examples of the judiciary's inability to provide
clarity on this issue, compare Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir.
1983), stating that "nothing in federal law precluded [city] police from enforcing the
criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act" but that authority
did not extend to civil violations, with United States v. Salinas-Calderon,728 F.2d
1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984), stating that "[a] state trooper has general
investigatory authority to inquire into possible immigration violations" and
therefore, "the trooper's question about the green card was reasonable."
38 See 2002 OLC Memo, supra note 34, at 11.
9 Wishnie, supra note 24, at 1087.
40 See 8 U.S.C § 1357(g) (2012); Cynthia Smith, 287(g) and Secure Communities:
The Facts About Local Immigration Law Enforcement, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS (May 2011), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-anddignity/immigration/stateandlocalimmigrationenforcement.cfm
[hereinafter U.S.

CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS]; VAUGHAN & EDWARDS, supra note 30, at 3. With the

establishment of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") in 2002, the vesting
authority was transferred to the DHS Secretary. See 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
41 VAUGHAN & EDWARDS, supra note 30, at 4.
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implemented 287(g) programs.12 By 2008, there were sixty-two
active 287(g) programs with an additional seventy-five awaiting
implementation.4 3
Implementation of the 287(g) program begins upon the
execution of a three-year Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA")
between the DHS and the local law enforcement agency ("LEA").
The MOA details the rights and responsibilities of each entity
under the program and the policies and procedures required for
its operation." Interested jurisdictions are offered a choice of two
287(g) programs: the Task Force Officer ("TFO") Model and the
Detention Model.4 5 Depending on the model being implemented,
the LEA selects officers to receive the DHS-approved training in
areas germane to that particular model, as well as a variety of
other subjects including civil rights law and the protocols for
When acting under the
public outreach and complaints.46
supervision of federal agents, local officers trained under the
TFO Model are vested with the power and authority to make
arrests for felony and misdemeanor violations of immigration law
and to detain and question persons reasonably believed to be
unlawfully present in the United States.4 7 The Detention Model,
primarily implemented in sheriffs offices and other jailing
houses, authorizes local officers to perform immigration-related
functions when arrestees in their facilities are believed to be in
violation of immigration law.48
The DOJ increased the program's effectiveness when it
began disseminating civil immigration information to local police
departments through the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), the nation's largest
42

See Capps, supra note 33, at 156.

43 See id. at 157-58 (noting that the majority ofjurisdictions participating are in

the Southwest and the fewest are in the Northeast).
14 See Memorandum of Agreement from the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. 1 (May
27, 2009) [hereinafter Homeland Memo 2009], available at http://www.aclunv.org/
files/New%20287g%20MOA%20(standardized).pdf.
45 Id. app. at 17. There is evidence of a third, lesser utilized category, the
Highway Patrol model whose main purpose is to "address the threat to public safety
posed by alien smuggling on the nation's highways." See VAUGHAN & EDWARDS,
supra note 30, at 10.
46 Homeland Memo 2009, supra note 44, at 17-18.
4 Id. at 19.
48 Id. at 21-22. These functions, which include the interrogation of arrestees
who are believed to be in the United States unlawfully and the service of arrest
warrants for immigration violations, must be performed in accord with DHS
enforcement priorities. See id.
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The accessibility of this
criminal information database.4 9
information at the local level enhanced the ability of 287(g)
departments to make arrests and detain suspected violators on
behalf of federal authorities. However, this unfettered access to
immigration data came at a cost, particularly to civil liberties.50
Because the DHS initially failed to institute parameters limiting
the type of offense justifying detention, critics charged that
287(g) officers were left largely to their own devices in
investigating and detaining suspected offenders, including the
determination of whom to stop and detain. 51
Despite the allegations of racial profiling and other abuses,
the 287(g) program continues to draw support and praise from
However, these jurisdictions
participating departments.5 2
represent a small percentage of the country's total police force,
leaving ICE with a limited number of "boots on the ground" to
shore up its internal enforcement efforts. S-Comm., the second
component of the DHS's local police outreach strategy, was
In terms of raw numbers of
designed to fill the void.

" See Wishnie, supra note 24, at 1096-97 (questioning the legality of the DOJ's
addition of civil immigration data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National
Crime Information Center ("NCIC") due to the absence of approval to do so in the
NCIC enabling statute). Established in 1967, NCIC, the so-called "lifeline of law
enforcement," acts as an electronic clearinghouse for traditional law enforcementrelated information such as criminal history files, fugitive and warrant records,
missing person reports, stolen property reports, and the National Sex Offender
Registry. National Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). Local and state
police agencies in all fifty states and in the District of Columbia submit this
information to the NCIC, which, upon request, makes the information available to
law enforcement agencies nationwide, thus enabling police to apprehend wanted
persons and recover stolen property in a streamlined and efficient manner. See id.
50 U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 40.
5' Id. In 2009, the Obama administration amended the MOA to include a
schedule of ICE's enforcement priorities designed to limit the scope of local
discretionary authority. See id.
52 NAT'L SHERRIFFS' ASS'N, NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) CRIMINAL ALIEN ENFORCEMENT
available at http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/tb/
(2010),
PROGRAMS
resolutions/2010-7.pdf; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING... ABOUT SECURE COMMUNITIES
(2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/what-otherssay.pdf.
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deportations, S-Comm., currently active in all fifty states and
ninety-seven percent of jurisdictions nationwide, has proved an
overwhelming success. 3
Launched by the Bush administration in 2008, S-Comm.
enabled ICE to increase its internal enforcement efforts without
bearing the training costs and constitutional concerns that
plagued the 287(g) program.5 4 Unlike 287(g) participants, police
in S-Comm. jurisdictions are not cross-designated as federal
immigration agents and do not perform any enforcement
function. Rather, through an enhancement of existing technology
used for the submission of fingerprint data routinely collected
during the booking process under the NCIC protocol, S-Comm.
enables police departments to submit that same data to the
DHS.5 5 If an arrestee is subject to deportation for a civil or
criminal violation of immigration law, the local department is
notified of a match, and may, depending on the nature of the
53 ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 7. The only states that are not fully
active are Alabama, Illinois, and Louisiana. Id. In fiscal year 2012, ICE removed
409,849 individuals, ninety-six percent of these removals fell into an ICE priority
category. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights
Focus on Key Prioritiesand Issues New National DetainerGuidance to FurtherFocus
Resources, U.S. IMMIGR.
& CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
(Dec.
21, 2012),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/12122lwashingtondc2.htm.
54 See U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 40; see also U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
BENEFITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES (2011),
availableat http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf.
"' The Secure Communities Process, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Secure Communities Process]. Each state has
an agency that links to the FBI's NCIC and maintains responsibility for the state's
criminal information records. Under S-Comm., this agency, the State Identification
Bureau ("SIB"), enters into an MOA with ICE. When arrestees are processed at a
local police department, their fingerprint data is submitted to the SIB, which, based
on whether the department is participating in S-Comm., will forward the fingerprint
cards to the FBI and DHS or to the FBI only if the arresting jurisdiction is not an SComm. participant. Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec. Immigration & Customs Enforcement and State Identification Bureau 3
[hereinafter Agreement with State Identification
Bureau], available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure-communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.p
df. Because it is the state, rather than the individual police department that enters
into the agreement, problems can arise in states where views on immigration policy
are split among local cities. See Brooks Barnes, California Sheriffs Oppose Bill on
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2012, at A19; Sandra Hernandez,
CaliforniaLawmakers Take Aim at Secure Communities, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/09/news/la-ol-immigration-california-criminals20120608.
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offense, be asked to detain the arrestee until custody is
transferred to ICE.5 6 Because local departments were required to
submit fingerprint data for all arrestees rather than those
suspected of being violators, ICE insisted that subjective
evaluations of suspicion and the attendant allegations of racial
profiling would be sharply reduced."
The DHS further distinguished S-Comm. from the 287(g)
program by touting the former's "risk-based" approach to
immigration enforcement, one that prioritized the identification
and removal of violent offenders that posed the greatest risk to
community safety.58 Under S-Comm.'s "three-level hierarchy" of
offenses justifying removal, cases involving Level One offenders,
that is, arrestees with prior convictions for aggravated felonies
and similar offenses, were given precedence over those involving
Level Two or Three offenders. 9 Although it prioritized the
removal of so-called criminal aliens, the DHS stopped short of
promising that enforcement would be limited to violent
offenders.60 The failure to do so, 6 1 coupled with high profile
mistakes in implementation,6 2 led to a wave of public criticism
against S-Comm. In response, Homeland Security Secretary
" Secure Communities Process, supra note 55; see also Agreement with State

Identification Bureau, supra note 55, at 3-4. If ICE issues a detainer request, the
LEA can hold the individual for up to forty-eight hours. See Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
" Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

http://www.ice.gov/securecommunities/

(last visited

Mar. 2,

2014); see U.S.

IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BENEFITTING
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
THROUGHOUT
THE
UNITED
STATES,
available at

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf.
58 See Agreement with State Identification Bureau, supra note 55, at 2.
59 Id. at 2-3. Level One offenses are aggravated felonies, crimes involving
national security, and related offenses; Level Two offenses are felonies and a few
misdemeanors, such as traffic offenses; and Level Three offenses are predominately
misdemeanors but also include extortion, military offenses, and election law
violations. See id.
60 Id. (stating that in cases involving Level Two and Three offenders, ICE would
"continue[] to exercise discretion through its field offices in taking enforcement
action.., as each situation demands").
61 See Semple, supra note 8; see also Romney, supra note 8; Sacchetti, supra
note 8.
62 See Shankar Vedantam, Call for Help Leads to Possible Deportation for
Hyattsville Mother, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2010, at B1 (chronicling story of Maria

Bolanos, a twenty-eight-year old undocumented El Salvadoran woman detained by
authorities after reporting an incident of domestic abuse to police in Prince George
County).
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Janet Napolitano acknowledged S-Comm.'s shortcomings but
characterized reports of the program's failure to distinguish
between violent offenders and misdemeanants as "unfounded"
and "contrary to reality." 3
As the murmur of discontent with S-Comm. grew to a roar,
executives in major cities began to listen. In a letter to the DHS
signaling his state's withdrawal from S-Comm., Illinois Governor
Pat Quinn cited the thirty percent of arrestees in Illinois facing
deportation that had "never been convicted of any crime, much
less a serious one," as evidence of the "conflict between the stated
purpose of Secure Communities and the implementation of the
program." 64 One month later, in June 2011, New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo suspended operation of S-Comm., noting that SComm. "compromis[es] public safety by deterring witnesses to
65
crime and others from working with law enforcement."
California has conditioned local police compliance with S-Comm.
upon state law requirements for treatment of undocumented
that
These actions evidence the belief
immigrants. 6
See Kyle Cheney, Homeland Security Head Counters Patrick, BOS. GLOBE
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/10/06/
napolitanocounters securecommunities claimsembracedbypatrick/. Napolitano
ultimately convened the Homeland Security Advisory Council ("HSAC"), a task force
of local police chiefs, academics, and various stakeholders in the immigration
enforcement debate, to assess, among other things, S-Comm.'s impact on community
policing and the efficacy of the enforcement priority schedule. Months later, a
splintered task force issued several recommendations, chief among them that ICE
consider withholding enforcement action based solely on minor traffic offenses.
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE
63

ON SECURE

COMMUNITIES:

FINDINGS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

22-23

(2011)

available
at
COUNCIL],
SEC.
ADVISORY
[hereinafter
HOMELAND
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findingsand-recommendations-report.pdf. A recommendation that ICE suspend enforcement
action for misdemeanor offenses was not adopted. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: ICE
RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14 (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-

communities/pdf/hsac-sc-taskforce-report.pdf.
64 See Letter from Pat Quinn, Governor of Ill., to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant
Dir., Secure Cmtys., Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec. (May 4, 2011), availableat http://epic.org/privacy/secure-communities/scill.pdf.
65 Letter from Mylan L. Denerstein, Counsel to the Governor, to John Sandweg,
Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S Dep't of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf.
66 See Information Bulletin from Kamala D. Harris, Att'y Gen., Cal. Dep't of
Justice, to Execs. of State & Local Law Enforcement Agencies (June 25, 2015),
available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/lawenforcement/14-01_le_
infobulletin.pdf.
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commensurate with the states' inherent authority to enforce
federal immigration law is the sovereign right to refuse to
cooperate.
D.

The Roots of Non-Cooperation

Under the INA, the states are authorized, but not required,
to assist in federal immigration enforcement.6 7 This recognition
of state autonomy is constitutionally rooted in the Tenth
Amendment's anti-commandeering doctrine, which bars the
federal government from enacting regulatory programs that
convert state and local officials into de facto federal agents.6"
Congress can, and frequently does, condition the receipt of
federal funds on a local jurisdiction's participation in a particular
program, but it cannot compel the states to administer or
implement federal policies.6 9
Balanced against the states'
freedom from federal overreach is the preemption doctrine, which
strikes down state and local policies that disrupt or interfere
with federal initiatives. 0
In the context of immigration
enforcement, the line separating non-cooperation, permissible
under anti-commandeering principles, and active interference,
prohibited by the preemption doctrine, is somewhat blurred.
In so-called "sanctuary cities," state and local officials
prohibit the use of local resources, monetary and otherwise, in
the enforcement of federal immigration law.7 1 The sanctuary
movement began in the 1980s in reaction to the federal
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (2012); see also 1996 OLC Opinion, supra note 22, at 29
("That the INA permits state police officers to make arrests and detentions does not
mean that states must permit their police to do so. Rather, the INA enforcement
authority of state police is subject to the provisions and limitations of state law."
(citation omitted)).
68 See U.S.
CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[tihe
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.; see also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (holding that Congress's power
to legislate in a particular area does not include the authority to command the states
to administer federal programs or to conscript state officers).
69 New York, 505 U.S. at 166-68.
70 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal
law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500-01
(2012) (detailing the scope of federal preemption doctrine).
71 See Rose Cuison Villazor,
"Sanctuary Cities" and Local Citizenship, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 576 (2010).
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government's policies toward Central American countries and the
refusal to grant asylum to persecuted refugees from El Salvador
and Guatemala.7 2 In its early days, the movement was led
largely by clergy members who risked prosecution and
imprisonment to shield undocumented refugees from detection
and deportation.73 By the 1980s, the sanctuary movement had
moved out of the church and into the political arena with several
municipalities using council resolutions, executive orders, and
similar means to express their support for those providing refuge
and to voice their opposition to United States' foreign policy,
specifically as it related to Central and Latin America. 4
Today, the sanctuary movement's base of protest has
expanded beyond the perceived injustices of U.S. asylum policy
and into federal immigration policy as a whole. When Congress
sought to strengthen its non-cooperation prohibitions through
more punitive regulations in the wake of the September 11th
attacks, several jurisdictions reaffirmed their sanctuary status in
response to what they viewed as the "drastic consequences" posed
by the "counterproductive, misguided measures" contained
within these proposed congressional regulations.7 5 At the state
72 See id. at 583.
13 See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a
Dangerous Misinterpretationof an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
747, 747-48 (1986) (tracing historical and Biblical roots of the sanctuary privilege
and criticizing its co-optation by modem day political activists). Federal law
prohibits the harboring of undocumented persons. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012). In
1985, the first large-scale enforcement effort to stifle sanctuary movement yielded
sixteen indictments and sixty arrests. See Carro, supra, at 748.
14 See Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations:Innocuous
Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 311-16 (1989). The city of
Cambridge, Massachusetts issued its "Sanctuary City Resolution" on April 8, 1985.
Cambridge, Mass., City Council Order Number 4 (Apr. 8, 1985) ("RESOLVED: That
the City of Cambridge not participate in any form in the compounding of injustice
against refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti or in the federal
government's persecution of those, who in good faith, offer humanitarian assistance
to the refugees .... ).
75 See Cambridge, Mass., City Council Order Number 16 (May 8, 2006). The
object of the Cambridge City Council's scorn was the Border Protection,
Antitefrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, a congressional
initiative that included the following provisions: unlawful status would become a
felony offense, 700 miles of fences would be built on the southern border, state and
local enforcement agencies would be declared to have inherent authority to enforce
immigration laws, and those entering without documents would be held without
bond. See generally Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). The new sanctuary movement
retained some of its religious roots. See Kara L. Wild, Note, The New Sanctuary
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level, both Alaska and Oregon have passed legislation prohibiting
the use of state resources in the enforcement of federal
immigration law.7 6
A less controversial approach to non-cooperation was at issue
in City of New York v. United States, which involved New York
City's Executive Order 124, a provision barring city employees
from sharing immigration data with federal authorities.7 7 The
case arose in the days following the passage of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a
federal statute prohibiting such local measures. 8 On the heels of
the bill's enactment, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
challenged its constitutionality on anti-commandeering grounds.
Specifically, Giuliani argued that New York City's sovereign
right to refuse to participate in the federal immigration
enforcement program included the authority to forbid city
employees from aiding the federal government, even on a
voluntary basis. 79 To the extent that § 1373 infringed upon that
right, according to Giuliani, it exceeded the scope of Congress's
authority.8 0
In denying Giuliani's claim, the Second Circuit appeared to
divide State responses to federal regulatory programs into two
categories: passive non-cooperation and passive resistance, with
only the former afforded Tenth Amendment protection."' The
court held that New York City's policy of prohibiting voluntary
cooperation by its employees could actively "frustrate
effectuation" of the federal immigration program and as such was
Movement: When Moral Mission Means Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for
Churches and Illegal Immigrants, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981, 995 (2010)
(detailing arrest and later deportation of Mexican national who took sanctuary in
Chicago's United Methodist Church).
76 See SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 32, at 22.
17
179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
71 See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 specifically provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
" See City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34. At the time, New York City's Executive
Order 124 prohibited city employees from voluntarily providing federal immigration
authorities with information concerning undocumented persons. N.Y.C., EXEC.
ORDER No. 124, CITY POLICY CONCERNING ALIENS (1989).
80 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34.
81 Id. at 35.
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barred by the Supremacy Clause.82 To hold otherwise would give
license to the states' use of the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering shield as a sword with which the states could
"hold the [federal government] hostage by selectively withholding
voluntary cooperation as to a particular program(s)." 83
Executive Order 124 was revoked in 2003 and replaced with
Executive Order 34.4 The "don't tell" provision at issue in City of
New York was removed but the "don't ask" provision, which
limits the circumstances under which city employees can inquire
about an individual's citizenship status, remained operative.8 5 In
the preamble to Executive Order 34, Mayor Michael Bloomberg
touched on the city's need to maintain "public trust and
confidence" in city government and its "commitment to protecting
its residents and visitors" in the event of a crime. 6 To that end,
Bloomberg directed the police department to institute its own
"don't ask" policy barring citizenship inquiries of crime victims
and witnesses and limiting other inquiries to the investigation of
"illegal activity other than mere status as an undocumented
7
alien."

Id.
11 See id. Despite its victory as a defendant in City of New York, the federal
government has adopted a "let sleeping dogs lie" approach when addressing its
reluctance to bring preemption challenges against sanctuary policies and similar
local ordinances. See Stephen Dinan & Kara Rowland, Justice:Sanctuary Cities Safe
from Law; Arizona's Policy 'Actively Interferes', WASH. TIMES (July 15, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.comLnews/2010/jul/14justice-sanctuary-cities-are-noarizona/?page=all (contrasting the DOJ's refusal to challenge sanctuary ordinances
with its efforts to strike down, on preemption grounds, Arizona's immigration
enforcement statute). In 2006, upon enactment of the Violence Against Women Act
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act, the Inspector General of the DOJ
was required to provide Congress with a list of cities and localities with sanctuary
policies that receive funds from the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. See
82

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT No. 07-07,
COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM

THE UNITED STATES 7 (2007); SEGHETrI ET AL., supra note 32, at 19.

84 See N.Y.C., EXEC. ORDER No. 34, CITY POLICY CONCERNING IMMIGRANT
ACCESS TO CITY SERVICES § 1 (2003).
85 See id. § 3(a).
8 See id. at pmbl.
87

See N.Y.C.,

EXEC. ORDER No. 41, CITY-WIDE PRIVACY POLICY AND

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 34 RELATING TO CITY POLICY CONCERNING

IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO CITY SERVICES § 4 (2003). In its original form, Executive

Order 34 made no mention of the police department's collection and dissemination of
citizenship data. See N.Y.C. EXEC. ORDER No. 34, supra note 84, § 4. Six months
later, the order was amended and the "don't ask" provision was inserted. See id.
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While acknowledging the need for local cooperation with
federal immigration authorities, Executive Order 34 also
recognized the importance of establishing and maintaining
trusting relationships with the city's immigrant community.
Polling data reveals that while nearly three-quarters of police
chiefs believe that immigration enforcement is a federal
responsibility, an equal number regularly communicate with ICE
about potential immigration violations.8 8 For them, striking the
proper balance between "community" and "policing" is a vexing
challenge that raises the question of whether the two competing
concerns are mutually exclusive. Before examining the efficacy
of community policing, and by extension opting out as a strategy
for fostering trust and cooperation amongst immigrant groups,
the smaller question of why people cooperate with the police
warrants discussion.

II. GAINING

TRUST AND COOPERATION THROUGH LEGITIMACY

"The heart8 9of the law enforcement function ... is one of
legitimacy."
Why do people trust in and cooperate with the police?
Leading social psychologist Tom Tyler advances two theories.
First, the instrumental model posits that people are motivated to
cooperate with the police by their own self-interest: fear of
punishment or expectation of benefit.9"
Viewed from this
perspective, opting out and other non-cooperation strategies will
produce the desired result because the targeted community,
undocumented immigrants, is shielded from federal immigration
enforcement and thereby incentivized to trust in and cooperate
with local police. But federal immigration authorities do not
88 SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., Immigration and Local Policing: Results from a
National Survey of Law Enforcement Executives, in POLICE FOUNDATION, THE ROLE
OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES, at app. G 169, 175-76 (2009). Of the departments surveyed, most
admitted that despite the frequent communication with ICE, no formal agreement
exists between their department and the federal government. See id. at 175.
89 SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE
OF PROFESSIONALISM 14 (1977).

90 See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
231, 233 (2008).
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operate in a vacuum.9 ' Assuming that local police are willing and
able to dissociate themselves completely from federal authorities,
it is unlikely that those impacted by federal enforcement action
would appreciate the distinction enough to apportion
accountability to federal authorities and maintain trust in local
police.9 2
Even if the police are successful in gaining trust and
cooperation,
the benefits of non-cooperation
from an
instrumental perspective are likely to be short-lived. At some
point, an individual will find that his interests are better served
by breaking, rather than complying, with the law.93 Empirical
evidence supports what parents of young children have known
for centuries:
Compliance secured by reward or fear of
punishment rarely lasts.94
If instrumental appeals were
successful in offering long-term solutions to crime problems,
police officials could control crime by simply controlling the
deployment of societal resources.9 5 Such an approach is both
unreliable and likely to result in the rapid depletion of much
needed resources.9 6
Tyler's second theory of cooperation, the social norms or
normative model, suggests that individual attitudes toward the
police are shaped by perceptions of legitimacy or those properties
of a police department that "leadU people to feel that [the
department] is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed."97 Once
achieved, a police department's legitimacy influences individual
levels of compliance and also impacts the community's
willingness to trust and cooperate with the police. 8 Having long

"'

See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 63, at 24.

92 See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Crossing the Line of Legitimacy: The Impact of

Cross-Deputization Policy on Crime Reporting, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 250,
256 (2013) (citing empirical data indicating that perceptions of law enforcement's
legitimacy can be harmed by a policy even when police themselves oppose that
policy).
93 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 21 (1999).
See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 90, at 234.
9 TYLER, supra note 93.
96 See Tom R.Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.

& SOC. SCI. 84, 88 (2004).
"7Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 12.
98 Id.
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accepted that they cannot realistically detect and prevent all
crime, police officials rely upon these external mechanisms of
social control to fulfill their law enforcement mission.99
Legitimacy is both hard to define and to evaluate. As Tyler
explains, the police "preoccupation" with legitimacy has masked
sharply divergent views about legitimacy's precise meaning and
how best to achieve and maintain it. 10 The steady growth of our
country's immigrant population adds another layer of complexity
to the task of predicting whether a specific policing strategy, like
opting out, will foster relationships of trust and cooperation.
Many immigrants arrive in the United States from countries in
which the rule of law has all but collapsed. 10 1 For those who are
here illegally, preconceived notions of governmental authority
exacerbate the fear of deportation, rendering undocumented
persons increasingly vulnerable to fraud, violence, and other
criminal acts.1 2 Local police departments, the first line of
defense against such predatory offenses, are handcuffed by the
unwillingness of crime victims and witnesses to trust the police
enough to step out from the shadows, particularly when the local
police are perceived as an adjunct of the larger federal
10 3
immigration enforcement regime.
9 See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 90.
100 Stephen

J.

Schulhofer

et

al.,

American

Policing at

a

Crossroads:

Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 338-41 (2011). Tyler's work represents the dominant theoretical
framework, but other social scientists view legitimacy's fundamental question as
"whether a power-holder is justified in claiming the right to hold power over other
citizens." Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A
Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 119, 124 (2012).
101 See Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 715, 723 (2004) (discussing rule of law crisis in Mexico and citizen
perceptions of inequality and corruption); see also Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic
Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 187 (2009). Tyler's study of immigrant
attitudes toward the police has related primarily to the impact on legitimacy of
police anti-terrorism initiatives in Muslim communities. See Tom R. Tyler et al.,
Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in CounterterrorismPolicing:A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 365, 366 (2010).
102 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation,and Crime Victims Afraid To
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1450-54 (2006); see also INT'L ASS'N OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION ISSUES 21 (2007).
'03 See M.C.C. IMMIGRATION COMM. MEMBERS, M.C.C. IMMIGRATION
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY
LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5-6 (2006); Raymond C. Davis, Organizing the Community
for Improved Policing,in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
88-89 (William A. Geller ed., 1985) (describing police chiefs efforts to secure
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Can legitimacy be achieved through opting out or similar
non-cooperation strategies? Part III examines the benefits and
potential costs of opting out as a community policing initiative.
As an exercise of discretionary authority under the community
preferences or political approach to legitimacy, opting out is
likely to result in short-term support for the police from certain
segments of the community. However, history suggests that
when the police internalize values that please some groups at the
expense and in opposition to others, they risk their integrity and
ultimately their legitimacy in the eyes of both groups. 10 4 If the
establishment of enduring relationships of trust and cooperation
with immigrant communities is the goal, the police must seek
alternative roads to legitimacy that, while harder to achieve, are
more likely to withstand the shifting political winds that grip our
nation's immigration reform debate.

III. COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY
Despite initial aspirations of autonomy, early American
police departments were viewed as instruments of political
control, with police chiefs in major cities like New York and
Chicago serving as figureheads for ward bosses who made hiring
decisions and dictated enforcement priorities. 10 5 As agents of the
political machine, police officers regularly abused their authority
for personal gain and in maintenance of the political status
quo. 10 6 For the latter part of the nineteenth century and well into
the twentieth century, a disgruntled public viewed the police as
bastions of inefficiency and corruption.'017 Early reformers saw
technological advances like the motorized patrol car and
structural changes such as the advent of the civil service system
as major steps toward much-needed professionalism in law
enforcement. 0 8

Hispanic community support by declaring publicly that police would not associate
with federal immigration authorities). But see VAUGHAN & EDWARDS, supra note 30,
at 18-20 (describing the "chilling effect" myth).
104 Thacher, supra note 15, at 792-93.
105 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 1, at 73.
106

See id.

See id. at 73-74.
See id. at 76-79. The drawbacks of the civil-service system, which depoliticized hiring and promotional processes, were illustrated in the aftermath of the
Rodney King beating at the hands of Los Angeles Police Department officers when
then-Chief Daryl Gates, a civil service appointee, was held largely unaccountable for
107
108
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The professional model of policing, as it came to be known,
succeeded in removing the corrupting effect of politics from
policing with its technical and unbiased approach to crime
suppression.
As exemplified by Sergeant Joe Friday of
television's Dragnet and his "just the facts" approach to crime
control, police officers held communities at arms-length and
eschewed personal interaction." 9 The advent of the motorized
patrol car rendered foot patrols obsolete. The 911 system and the
rapid response culture it spawned grew to dominate policing and
the public's expectation of how and how quickly police services
would be received. 110
Among the many collateral consequences of this rigid datadriven approach, in which enforcement priorities were set
relative to crime rates, was the alienation of minorities,
specifically those in urban ghettos where the police were viewed
as an occupying force."1
During the mid-to-late sixties, the
growing tensions between blacks and the police boiled over,
resulting in prolonged periods of civil unrest." 2 The black
community's mistrust of and resentment toward the police was
deep-seated and, to some extent, reciprocated.'
The interest of
minorities in equal protection of the law seemed incompatible

his failure of leadership. See id. at 81. For in-depth treatment of the shift from the
political to the professional model, see id. at 76-77.
109 See STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS
OF COMMUNITY 21 (2006).
110 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 1, at 89.

111 See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 203-04
(1998); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1771-72
(2006). The 911 system also fostered increased feelings of isolation for individual
officers and a false sense of security in a public that, having grown accustomed to
rapid response by the police, was less inclined to take appropriate measures to
protect themselves and their families. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 1, at 94102.
112 See Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-OrientedPolicing, 39 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 13-14 (2010) (citing National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders

report concluding that, amongst inner-city blacks, the police were perceived as
instruments of "white power, white racism, and white repression"); Christopher
Cooper, An Afrocentric Perspective on Policing,in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 362, 366 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds.,

6th ed. 2010).
113 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 1, at 88 (describing the police "thin blue
line" mentality whereas entire segments of society, particularly minority youth, are
viewed as "the enemy").
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with the work of the police, particularly when the era's prevailing
policing strategy, the professional model, was aimed at crime
control by any means necessary.'
A.

The Emergence of Community Policing

Beyond the professional model's alienation of minority
communities was mounting evidence of the 911 system's
inefficiency in controlling crime."' In the mid-1980s, progressive
police leaders launched a series of new programs designed to
expand the work of the police beyond the law enforcement
function." 6 These initiatives, grouped collectively under the
heading of community policing, were designed to enhance police
responsiveness to crime, fear of crime, and the deteriorating
quality of life in urban neighborhoods."' Unlike the traditional
policing model, where police departments allocated resources to
combat what they deemed to be serious crime, police were now
encouraged to collaborate with the community in developing
strategies to address crime and those conditions that, when
permitted to fester, contributed to a sense of unlawfulness that
permeated the entire community." 8
The advent of community policing saw the return of foot
patrols and other remnants of policing's early days. "Beat cops"
were permanently assigned to individual neighborhoods where
they maintained frequent contact with, and were readily
identifiable by, those living and working in their patrol area."19
This renewed commitment to beat integrity fostered the belief in
the officer and the neighborhood resident that they were each
stakeholders in the community's success. Through his outreach
efforts, the beat cop developed a "reservoir of respect and

114 See Kenneth Aaron Betsalel, Police Leadership and the Reconciliation of
Police-Minority Relations, AM. J. POLICE, 1990, at 66 ("In essence, the conflict
between minorities and police from this perspective is between competing value
claims of individual liberty versus the need for social order."). To some, the problem
seemed intractable. See id. at 65-66 (citing early prognostications of failure for
police initiatives designed to improve police minority relations).
115 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 1, at 70-71.
16 See Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential,
Basic Requirements, and Threshold Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 6-7 (1987).
117 See id. at 7.

1'

See Reisig, supra note 112, at 1-2.

119See Goldstein, supra note 116, at 9-10.
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support" that would ultimately assist him in addressing
neighborhood problems without relying on traditional means of
coercive force.12 °
Today, community policing, the "preeminent reform agenda

of modern

policing, "121

has

become part of our cultural

vernacular. Its imprimatur has been bestowed upon a myriad of
outreach strategies, from the deployment of foot patrol officers to
In many
the creation of storefront police substations.
departments, these efforts are geared primarily toward
improving the fractured relationship between police and minority
communities. 122 The police chiefs commitment and the level of
community participation dictate whether community policing
operates solely as the function of a specialized group of officers
or as a precinct-wide philosophy that infuses the work of the
entire department..'2 3
PoliticalLegitimacy and the "New" Community Policing
While these variations in scope make it difficult to evaluate
community policing's success, community policing programs are
readily distinguishable by the degree in which the community
participates in the decision-making process. 124 At the highest
level, categorized by former police chief and noted criminologist
Gary Cordner as the "philosophical dimension" of community
policing, citizens have open access to police departments and the
opportunity to influence how they are policed. 12 This approach,
or the "new community policing,"1 26 recognizes the right and

B.

120 See id. at 10.
121

See Gary W. Cordner, Community Policing Elements and Effects, in CRITICAL

ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 432, 432 (Roger G. Dunham &
Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 6th ed. 2010).
122 See CHI. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 13; WASSERMAN, supra note 13 ("The

Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) initiative focuses on developing
relationships of trust between law enforcement.., and the communities they serve,
particularly immigrant and minority communities. ... "); Community Relations
Division, supra note 13 (stating that the "Community Relations Division
continuously strives toward maintaining open avenues of discourse," especially with
minority communities).
123 See Cordner, supra note 121,
at 433 (describing various dimensions of
community policing).
124 Goldstein, supra note 116, at 24-25.
125 See Cordner, supra note 121, at 433-34.
126 Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160-61 (1998). The new community
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responsibility of individual communities to participate in their
own self-governance by setting enforcement priorities that reflect
their shared values.'2 7 Legitimacy is achieved where the legal
authority of the police to act is augmented by community support
for and validation of police policies that restore or preserve the
quality of life in affected areas.1 28
In this way, the new community policing represents a
departure, but not a complete break, from the political model of
policing in that it requires police officials to solicit support from
and forge partnerships with affected segments of the community,
including business leaders, housing organizations, and civil
rights groups. 29 Much like the political bosses of the past, these
new partners possess their own internal values, agendas, and
constituencies. 130 Tailoring police services to meet the diverse
needs of these external groups can yield positive results for police
executives seeking community support, but it can also erode the
legitimacy of the police in the eyes of those community members
who perceive the police as having been co-opted by the special
interests of the highly vocal and politically active segments of the
community.131
The potential costs of co-optation increase dramatically when
the police solicit community support for policies that expand or
constrict the scope of their discretionary authority. The use of
discretion, generally disfavored by early leaders of the police

policing differs from its predecessor in its treatment of minorities, particularly
African Americans, who have increased political clout. Id. at 1161.
127 See

David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devil's

Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 235 (Jack R. Greene
& Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1991) ("Community policing is indeed democratic

policing. Strategic choices by departments as well as activities of individual officers
are worked out under community policing in

a consensual

manner with a

responsible public.").
128 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 653-54
(1997).
129 See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Shaping and Serving the Community: The Role of the

Police ChiefExecutive, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY

61, 67 (William A. Geller ed., 1985).
130 See Stephen D. Mastrofski, Eying the Doughnut: Community Policing and
Progressive Reform, 12 AM. J. POLICE 1, 14-15 (1993) (reviewing MALCOLM K.
SPARROW ET AL., BEYOND 911: A NEW ERA FOR POLICING (1990)).
11 See Thacher, supra note 15. This co-optation, according to Thacher, results

from a police department's abandonment of"essential institutional values in order to
secure outside support." Id. at 770.
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reform movement,'32 has always been a hallmark of community
policing. 133 With the emergence of the new community policing,
however, discretion has become politicized because the
community is now an active participant in shaping the scope and
34
breadth of the police department's discretionary authority.
Chicago's attempt to curb gang violence illustrates the intended
benefits and hidden costs that flow from expansions of
discretionary authority under the community preferences or
political model of legitimacy.
C.

The New Community Policing in Action: The Chicago Gang
Ordinance

In 1992, the Chicago City Council took "aggressive action" to
stem criminal street gang activity-thought by many to be the
root cause of an alarming increase in the city's murder and
violent crime rates. 3 5 During a series of emotionally charged and
bitterly contested public hearings, residents spoke of the
intimidating presence of gang members within the community
and expressed frustration with the police department's inability
or perceived unwillingness to take enforcement action. 136 To

132 See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 586-87
(1960).
[T]he police should operate in an atmosphere which exhorts and commands
them to invoke impartially all criminal laws within the bounds of full
enforcement .... Responsibility for the enactment, amendment, and repeal
of the criminal laws will not, then, be abandoned to the whim of each police
officer or department, but retained where it belongs in a democracy-with
elected representatives.
Id. at 586-87 (footnotes omitted).
133 See Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Law Enforcement in a Time of Community
Policing, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 539, 541 (1995). Because full enforcement of the law in
every instance is neither practical nor likely to produce the desired result,
community policing encourages police officials to seek alternatives to arrest when
devising strategies to combat crime and maintain public safety. Id.
134 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 126, at 1169-70.
135 Memorandum from Eleanor D. Acheson, Assistant Att'y Gen., to the Solicitor
Gen. (May 21, 2008).
136 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 100-01 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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confront and cure these "social ills,"1 37 the City Council passed
the Gang Congregation Ordinance, a measure 13prohibiting
loitering in public areas by suspected gang members. 1
The anti-loitering ordinance was controversial from its
inception, particularly in its expansion of police discretionary
authority to stop those reasonably believed to be gang members
or those found loitering in public places with suspected gang
members. 139 In a preemptive strike against what many viewed as
the very real possibility of large-scale harassment and profiling,
the expansive grant of discretionary authority was offset by
procedural limitations within the ordinance itself as well as
internal police guidelines that strictly defined both the areas in
which the ordinance could be enforced and the number of officers
With these
qualified to make arrests for its violation. 40
safeguards in place, officers were guided in the exercise of their
discretionary authority and were, according to the ordinance's
supporters, accountable to the community for14 1 any failure to
exercise their discretion in a principled manner.

137 Id. at 101. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138 CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015

(1992). The Gang Congregation

Ordinance stated, in pertinent part:
Whenever a police officer observes a member of a criminal street gang
engaged in gang loitering with one or more other persons in any public
place ... [the police officer shall] order all such persons to disperse and
remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at which the
order was issued ....
Id. § 8-4-015(a). The ordinance defined loitering as "remaining in any one place
under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the
purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street gang to establish
control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to
conceal illegal activities." Id. § 8-4-015(d)(1).
139 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.34 (plurality opinion). Of the sixty-six named
defendants in the series of cases ultimately consolidated into Morales, thirty-four
were accused of violating the measure by being in the presence of a gang member.
Id.
140 See Chi., Ill., Police Dep't Gen. Order No. 92-4 (Aug. 8, 1992). Under
departmental policy, arrest authority was delegated to a select group of specially
trained officers who were authorized to enforce the ordinance in those designated
areas with demonstrated gang problems. Meares & Kahan, supra note 111, at 200.
141 See id. at 211. Despite the built-in protections, a divided Supreme Court
struck down the Chicago ordinance, finding that the measure vested too much
discretionary authority in the police. Morales, 527 U.S. at 64. Of the six opinions in
the case, Justice Stevens's opinion striking down the ordinance for its failure to limit
police discretionary authority was the only one to garner majority support. See id. at
45-64.
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While the Chicago ordinance enjoyed widespread community
support, 1 42 it had more than its share of detractors, particularly
from within the legal academy. Because of the illusory nature of
"community," critics bemoaned police officials' ill-conceived
reliance on "community" preferences in the adoption of
discretionary policies.' 4 3 Communities, or "group[s] of people
with a common history, common beliefs and understandings," are
increasingly rare in modern society.14 4 Even where a genuine
community can be identified, its preferences will invariably
alienate the "misfits, dissidents, and outsiders" within that same
community. 145 The resulting fragmentation compromises the
legitimacy of the police.14 These same concerns apply with equal
force to opting out.
IV.

OPTING OUT AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF COMMUNITIES

To be sure, the Chicago ordinance and other anti-vagrancy
statutes merit additional scrutiny due in large part to the longstanding constitutional concerns raised by the expansion of police
discretionary authority to identify and arrest potential
lawbreakers. 14' Although opting out does not trigger that same
142 Meares & Kahan, supra note 111, at 199. But see Albert W. Alschuler &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to
Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 217-18 (1998)
(questioning Meares and Kahan's claims of broad support for the anti-gang
ordinance among African Americans). For Meares and Kahan's response to the
allegation that they overstated the level of African American support for the Chicago
loitering ordinance, see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray:
A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 245, 246-47 (1998).
14 See Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING
AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 49, 55 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
1999); David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1085-86
(1999); Michael S. Scott, Community Justice in Policing, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 415, 435
(2006).
1" See Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 241, 247-48 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1991).
141 Cole, supra note 143, at 1082-83.
146 See Thacher, supra note 15, at 766, 768.
147 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (striking
down a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance for vagueness because "it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions"). Years before
Papachristou was decided, Justice Douglas, who went on to author the Court's
opinion, denounced vagrancy and loitering statutes and other devices used against
"consumers of injustice," like minorities, who lacked "the prestige to prevent an easy

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:105

rights-based apprehension, the "hydraulic pressures of apparent
social imperative" that overwhelmed the residents of Chicago and
their police department are just as forceful and potentially
hazardous here. 148 In the context of immigration enforcement,
police policy is shaped by an extra-political collaboration of
unelected decision makers: the police and those advocating for
more expansive immigration policies. 149 By opting out, police
executives risk missing the trees-the conceivable loss of their
own legitimacy-in the forest of good will generated by their
The resulting backlash evidences a
political benevolence. 1 0
growing hostility toward the very group the police set out to
protect.
A.

Immigration and the Growing DisconnectBetween the Police
and the Public

As recent maneuvering in our nation's capital demonstrates,
reaching consensus on immigration enforcement remains an
elusive goal."' Like their congressional representatives, the
laying-on of hands by the police." William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on
Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13-14 (1960).
148 Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 870-71 (1999).
149See Wesley G. Skogan, Everybody's Business, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING
AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 58, 60-61 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 1999).
1,0 Politics do indeed make strange bedfellows, as evidenced by the
overwhelming support for opting out from the same groups that forcefully oppose the
exercise of community-generated discretionary authority in other contexts. Compare
Letter from Steven Brown, R.I. Affiliate, Am. Civil Liberties Union, et al., to Angel
Taveras, Mayor-Elect, Transition Office (Dec. 30, 2010), available at
http://riaclu.envisionbeta.net/images/uploads/SCommLetter TojTaveras_2011.pdf
(urging "Providence [to refrain] from participating in... Secure Communities"),
with Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (urging
the Supreme Court to strike down Chicago's anti-gang ordinance because "police
officers [were] left completely to their own devices, without standards, in
determining when to enforce and when not to enforce the ordinance").
151 See Lauren Fox, For Some in GOP, Immigration Reform Moving Too Fast,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/03/20/forsome-in-gop-immigration-reform-moving-too-fast (criticizing the Senate's "Gang of
Eight" immigration reform outline as occurring too quickly). Compare Elise Foley,
Tom Tancredo Bashes Rand Paul for Immigration Stance, Sticks to 'Self-Deport'
Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/03/22/tom-tancredo-rand-paul-immigration-n 2935485.html (arguing
that "strict enforcement of employer sanctions and allowing local police to cooperate
'self deport' "), with
in immigration enforcement will encourage most illegals to.
Rand Paul, Sen. Rand Paul: Trust but Verify on Immigration Reform, WASH. TIMES
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public at large is similarly fragmented with polling data
revealing a wide disparity in views both nationwide and within
immigrant communities." 2 At the local level, the contentious
immigration debate presents a confusing picture for police
officials dealing with conflicting community expectations. 5 3 In
other contexts, according to these executives, citizens have
deferred to the authority of the police where policymaking is
When enforcement policies involve immigration,
concerned.
however, the decision-making process is met with skepticism that
in some cases results in litigation.'5 4
In San Francisco, the community was splintered by a single
traumatic event that changed previously ambivalent attitudes
Anthony
toward the city's long-standing sanctuary status.
Bologna, a married father of three, and two of his sons were
fatally shot while driving in the family car.'5 5 The lone witness to

(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/8/sen-rand-paultrust-verify-immigration-reform/ (calling for prioritizing STEM Visas, expanding
work VISA program, and normalizing "the status of the 11 million undocumented
citizens so they can join the workforce").
152 PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW RESEARCH CTR., A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A
PORTRAIT OF THE 40 MILLION, INCLUDING 11 MILLION UNAUTHORIZED 4 (2013),

available at www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/01/statistical-portrait final-jan_29.pdf
(stating twenty-eight percent of adults believe "illegal immigration should be given
to tighter restrictions... while 27% say creating a path to citizenship should be
given the priority"); MARK HUGO LOPEZ ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW RESEARCH
CTR., ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BACKLASH WORRIES, DIVIDES LATINOS, at i (2010),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/128.pdf ("A small majority (53%)
says they should pay a fine but not be deported. A small minority (13%) says they
should be deported, and a larger minority (28%) says they should not be punished.").
The same "political disconnect" can be found between the general public and the
legal academy. See Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect Between Public Attitudes and
Policy Outcomes in Immigration, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 17, 17, 27-28 (Carol M.
Swain ed., 2007).
153 See DECKER ET AL., supra note 88, at 169-70; see also HOFFMASTER ET AL.,
supra note 4, at iii (examining the disjointed nature of police community
communications vis-a-vis immigration policy in six major cities).
154 See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 722-23 (Ct. App. 2009)
(seeking to enjoin Los Angeles police chief from enforcing police policy precluding
police from asking crime victims and witnesses about their immigration status and
from making arrests for unlawful entry into the United States); Fonseca v. Fong, 84
Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 2008) (challenging San Francisco police chiefs
"disregard[]" of local health and safety code provision requiring that police notify
federal authorities upon the arrest of any non-citizen for a specified drug offense);
see also HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 40. Both Sturgeon and Fonseca were
dismissed prior to trial.
"' Bologna v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 408 (Ct. App. 2011).
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the crime was Bologna's other son, Andrew.' 56 Within weeks of
the murders it was revealed that the suspect, Edwin Ramos, a
gang member with a long juvenile record of violent offenses, was
also an undocumented immigrant who had escaped deportation
due to sanctuary policies that prohibited the release of juvenile
offender information to federal immigration authorities.' 57 The
news ignited a firestorm of public backlash against city officials
and the local police department. 5 ' Political operatives on both
sides of the aisle seized the opportunity to use the tragedy to
159
advance their agendas.
When these partisan battles erupt, the police erode their
legitimacy by taking sides. Equally damaging is the tendency to
demonize those community members who express opposition.
For instance, in Santa Ana, California, former police Chief
Raymond Davis instituted a policy of non-cooperation with
federal immigration authorities.16° According to Chief Davis,
doing so was necessitated by the need to "generate strong policecommunity collaboration. '161 Not surprisingly, the decision was

Id. 408-09.
...Id. at 409. But see Demian Bulwa, S.F. Family's Murderer Killed Before, FBI
Was Told, SFGATE (July 1, 2012, 11:25 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/SF-family-s-murderer-killed-before-FBI-was-told-3676718.php#page-2 (alleging that
F.B.I., and not local police, failed to report Ramos to immigration authorities after
learning of his involvement in a gang murder several years before the Bologna
slayings). Federal authorities refused to comment on the allegation. See id. A suit
filed by the surviving members of the Bologna family against the city of San
Francisco and its police department was dismissed. See Bologna, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 410.
158 See Jaxon Van Derbeken, Family Blames Sanctuary Policy in 3 Slayings,
SFGATE (Aug. 23, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.comldefault/article/Familyblames-sanctuary-policy-in-3-slayings-3272118.php.
19 See John Cot6, San FranciscoSanctuary Rule Change Moves Ahead, SFGATE
(Oct. 6, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/San-Franciscosanctuary-rule-change-moves-ahead-3214469.php;
see also Nina Martin, No
Sanctuary for Danielle Bologna, S.F. MAG. (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.modern
luxury.com/san-francisco/story/no-sanctuary-danielle-bologna.
160 See Davis, supra note 103.
161 Id. at 88. At the time, Santa Ana had seen its minority-predominately
Hispanic-population increase more than fifty percent in a span of a few short years.
See id. at 88-89.
156
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met with some resistance. 162 What was surprising, however, was
Chief Davis's characterization of opposition groups as the "white
power structure." 63
When the police expand their discretionary authority in the
enforcement of the law, as was the case in Chicago, critics rightly
observed that the use of discretion fragments the community by
creating winners and losers.1

64

History has shown that the

"losers" are typically minorities and other disenfranchised
groups. 165 When the "winners" are a historically disenfranchised
minority group, as is the case with opting out, it is easy for police
executives like Chief Davis to derisively dismiss opponents as
'
xenophobic or racist. 66
In doing so, these officials ignore the
competing interests, attitudes, and agendas that exist between
minority groups, differences that the police should consider when
promulgating policies designed to improve their fractured
relationships with one segment of the "minority community."
B.

The Tenuous Relationship Between African Americans and
Immigrants

Community policing arose from the ashes of the urban riots
of the 1960s when the relationship between police and the
minorities, particularly African Americans, reached its breaking
point. Empirical data suggests that community policing has
succeeded in improving attitudes toward the police among
162 See id.

at 88 ("In Santa Ana, the police leadership has been condemned by the
163 Id.
white power structure because of our strong move to secure Hispanic community
support....").
'"
Cole, supra note 143, at 1082-83.
161 See id.

Id.

Discretion makes selection possible; the salient point is that someone will
always be the loser in the selection process, and that the losers will
generally be those without effective political power. In some communities,
the losers might be racial minorities; in others they might be immigrants or
young people; in still others they might be people with political or cultural
values that depart from the majority's. But every "community" will have its
misfits, dissidents, and outsiders.

166 See INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 102, at 18-19. This
statement is not to downplay or deny the reality that some opposition to expansive
immigration policies is fueled by racial animosity. See id. at 18 (citing federal
intelligence reports that indicate "former and current members of hate groups,
which advocate violence against immigrants" have joined groups that "have linked
security concerns with illegal immigration").
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minorities. 167 Viewed myopically as ameliorative efforts to
repair, restore, and establish trusting relationships between the
police and the minority community, strategies such as opting out
escape scrutiny or meaningful discussion because the targeted
beneficiaries are themselves minorities. However, intra-minority
16 8
group dynamics are not so easily encapsulated.
The tension between native blacks and immigrants is as old
as immigration itself. In the post-antebellum South, newly freed
slaves seeking job opportunities faced stiff competition from
European immigrants, prompting Booker T. Washington to urge
white American employers to cast their buckets down in the
large pool of available black labor. 16 9 What sets the current
immigration debate apart from its predecessor is the coalition of
blacks and today's immigrants-largely Hispanic-an alliance
that some contend inhibits honest discourse about the impact of
170
illegal immigration on African Americans.
167 See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA:
CONFLICT AND REFORM 169-71 (2006). Studies indicate that blacks express higher

levels of support for community policing initiatives than whites and Hispanics; when
asked, blacks expressed desire for "more police (1) interaction with neighborhood
residents, (2) involvement in community programs, and (3) engagement with
teenagers." Id. at 169. For Meares and Kahan's response to the allegation that they
overstated the level of African American support for the Chicago loitering ordinance,
see Meares & Kahan, supra note 1.
168 Joel F. Handler, It's Not So Simple, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING
AND RIGHTS
IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 45, 47-48 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999)
(citing intra-minority group conflict as a major precipitating factor in the Los
Angeles riots).
169 See Booker T. Washington, Address at the Atlanta Cotton States and
International Exposition: Atlanta Compromise Speech (Sept. 18, 1895), available at
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/sayitplain/btwashington.html.
To those of the white race who look to the incoming of those of foreign birth
and strange tongue and habits for the prosperity of the South, were I
permitted I would repeat what I have said to my own race, "Cast down your
bucket where you are." Cast it down among the eight millions of Negroes
whose habits you know, whose fidelity and love you have tested in days
when to have proved treacherous meant the ruin of your firesides. Cast
down your bucket among these people who have, without strikes and labor
wars, tilled your fields, cleared your forests, builded [sic] your railroads and
cities, and brought forth treasures from the bowels of the earth, and helped
to make possible this magnificent representation of the progress of the
South.
Id.
170 See Carol M. Swain, The Congressional Black Caucus and the
Impact of
Immigration on African American Unemployment, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 175,
178-79 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (criticizing Congressional Black Caucus's failure
to openly discuss the negative economic impact of illegal immigration on African
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From this failure to address hard questions about the
competing interests of minority groups, double standards
emerge. 17 '
Ostensibly benign attempts to foster better
relationships with immigrants can very easily be perceived as
"bending the law so as not to offend,"172 an approach far removed
from the traditional reactive mode of policing deployed in black
communities. Ultimately, the perceived lack of evenhanded
enforcement weakens the rule of law and erodes the legitimacy of
the police.1 73 It can also exacerbate
existing tensions between
174
African Americans and immigrants.

CONCLUSION

The quest for legitimacy has precipitated every major
historical shift in policing, from the professional model to present
day community policing. The public's frustration with and open
hostility toward a politicized police force spurred the crisis of
legitimacy and led to the reform era of policing. 75 Reformers
responded by abandoning the political model of policing in favor
of the professional model in hopes that trust would flow from the
perceived legitimacy of a newly-detached police force that was
disentangled from political machinations. 76 The professional era
failed when police executives discovered that public levels of
support for or trust in the police as an institution rarely equated

Americans despite majority support for stricter immigration enforcement amongst
their constituents); see also Schuck, supra note 152, at 23-24 (discussing
neutralization of black civil rights organizations based on political liberalism and
alliances with pro-immigrant groups).
171 DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (1999).
172 See Bayley, supra note 127, at 232.

Id. at 231.
See Scott Cummings & Thomas Lambert, Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian
Sentiments Among African-Americans, 78 SoC. SCI. Q. 338, 340 (1997) (describing
support among African Americans in California for Proposition 187, a measure
aimed at restricting state assistance to illegal immigrants); see also Kevin R.
Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects
for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107-08 (2007)
(noting the absence of African Americans from immigrant support rallies and calling
for an open dialogue between black and Hispanic leaders to address simmering
animosities between the two groups).
" See WALKER, supra note 89.
176 See Schulhofer et al., supra note 100, at 339.
11
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with statistical measures of crime-fighting success, particularly
in minority communities where attitudes of mistrust toward the
police were pervasive.
Community policing offers police executives the opportunity
to make real inroads with traditionally underserved
communities. However, the police cannot abandon essential
values to secure community support. 177 As Tyler and others have
suggested, regulation does not undermine legitimacy. 17 ' Rather,
perceptions of legitimacy are formed by the methods police use to
enforce the law. Trust and cooperation flow from individual
beliefs that the procedures involved in the decision-making
process are neutral, evenhanded, and consistent. 179 Community
policing and immigration enforcement can co-exist, but it will
require the police to accept that policing cannot always be
popular.' 80 The police exist in modern society because of our
continued need for an institution "with a virtually unrestricted
right" to use force, oftentimes lethal force, to maintain order.','
To reconcile ourselves to that uncomfortable reality, we, as a
society, employ "concealments" to foster the appearance of the
police as something other than what they actually are. 82 Opting
out is one such concealment.
For local police, full enforcement of immigration law may not
be the appropriate response in every situation, but it should
remain an option. The community must trust that the police will
exercise their discretionary authority in a responsible manner.
In turn, the police must remain accountable to the community for
any failures. Only then can true legitimacy be achieved. When
discretionary policies are shaped by community preferences,
legitimacy lasts only as long as the next election cycle.

See Thacher, supra note 15.
See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 12 (police legitimacy includes "credible
sanctioning threats for those who break rules").
' See TYLER, supra note 93, at 161-62 (police can gain compliance from the
public "for their decision and rules by making and implementing them in ways that
the public thinks is fair").
180 See Bayley, supra note 127, at 236 ("[P]olicing cannot always be popular and
must always be equitable.").
181 Klockars, supra note 144, at 257.
182 See id.
177
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